Golden Gate University Law Review
Volume 33
Issue 1 Ninth Circuit Survey

Article 3

January 2003

Sticks and Stones May Break Your Bones ... But
Words May Break the Bank: Monetary Damages
For 'True Threats' and the Future of Free Speech
After Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/
Willamette v. American Coalition of Life Activists
Randall D. Nicholson

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev
Part of the Civil Law Commons, and the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons
Recommended Citation
Randall D. Nicholson, Sticks and Stones May Break Your Bones ... But Words May Break the Bank: Monetary Damages For 'True Threats'
and the Future of Free Speech After Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 33 Golden Gate
U. L. Rev. (2003).
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol33/iss1/3

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Golden Gate University Law Review by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.
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NOTE
STICKS AND STONES MAY BREAK YOUR
BONES . .. BUT WORDS MAY BREAK THE
BANK: MONETARY DAMAGES FOR

'TRUE THREATS' AND THE
FUTURE OF FREE SPEECH AFTER
PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF THE
COLUMBIAIWILLAMETTE V.
AMERICAN COALITION OF LIFE
ACTIVISTS
INTRODUCTION

The only difference between the expression of an opinion and
an incitement in the narrower sense is the speaker's
enthusiasm for the result. Eloquence may set fire to reason.
-Oliver Wendell Holmes- 1

In May of 2002, an en bane panel of the Ninth Circuit held
that the use of "Wanted" style posters to list personal
information about abortion providers by anti-choice groups was
not protected by the First Amendment. 2 Prior to this case,
three abortion providers, all of whom had been subjects of
similar wanted-style posters, were murdered. 3 Seen in the
context of these murders, the majority reasoned that the

Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Planned Parenthood of the ColumbiaIWillamette, Inc., v. American Coalition of
Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002).
3 The murdered doctors were Dr. David Gunn, Dr. George Patterson and Dr. John
Britton. See Background Section infra notes 12 to 24.
I

2

1

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2003

1

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 3

2

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33

posters had "acquired currency" as a harbinger for the
impending death of the poster's subject.4 When viewed through
this lens, the majority held that the posters amounted to 'true
threats' that landed outside the usually wide purview of the
First Amendment.
In finding the defendants civilly liable for threatening
speech, the court upheld a permanent injunction prohibiting
the use of the poster format. Although an enormous punitive
damages award of over $108 million was vacated and
remanded to determine if it comported with due process, the
court nevertheless stayed a general damages award of over
$525,000. 5 This Note contends that the use of wanted-style
posters, while of questionable taste, is nothing more than a
form of political activism that is generally protected by the
First Amendment. 6 Furthermore, this Note argues that
excessive monetary judgments for speech made on issues of
social and political import improperly narrows freedom of
speech.
In support of these contentions, this Note is divided into
five parts. Part I introduces the plaintiffs and defendants in
Planned Parenthood and provides a detailed description of the
content of the posters as well as the other evidence used to find
the defendants liable for threatening speech. 7 Part II presents
a brief description of the details of, and impetus for, the
enactment of the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act
("FACE"), as the act provides the basis for liability.s To
Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/ Willamette, 290 F.3d at 1079.
Id. at 1066, 1088. The Plaintiffs' sued under both the Freedom of Access to
Clinics Entrances Act (FACE), 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(I), as well as under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1962. While the a
discussion of the RICO claims is outside the scope of this Note, it is important here to
observe that when the compensatory and punitive damage award of the FACE claims
are added to the RICO damage awards, the total damages awarded were
$120,868,893.00. See also id. at 1062, 1066n.4.
6 See e.g., United States v. Watts, 394 U.S. 705, 706 (1969) (given our "profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust and wide open, and may well include vehement, caustic and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials."). Id. (citing
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 383 U.S. 254, 270 (1966»; see also N~tional
Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S.
898 926-927 (1982) (where liability is based on "a public address--which predominantly
contained highly charged political rhetoric lying at the core of the First Amendmentwe approach the suggested basis for liability with extreme care."). Id.
7 See infra notes 12 to 63 and accompanying text.
S
See infra notes 64 to 71 and accompanying text. The plaintiffs also alleged that
4

5
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highlight that the majority's position in Planned Parenthood
did not comport with current First Amendment jurisprudence,
Part III analyzes the major decisions handed down in this area
in the past four decades. 9 Part IV offers a synthesis of the facts
of the instant case with the precedent set forth in the cases
discussed in Part III. Part IV argues that under the Supreme
Court's 'true threat' precedent, as well as the Ninth Circuit's
own standard for defining a 'threat,' the posters and supporting
evidence must be viewed as the type of political speech that has
long been protected by the First Amendment. 1o Finally, Part V
looks at other cases where liability was premised on a violation
of FACE and suggests that even if liability was proper in the
instant case, the remedy was not.1 1 Injunctive relief is the
least restrictive with respects to prohibiting political speech
and should be the preferred remedy if political speech steps
outside the protections provided by the First Amendment.
I. BACKGROUND
A.

CONTEXTUAL BACKDROP

On March 10, 1993, Dr. David Gunn was shot and killed as
he entered the Pensacola, Florida clinic where he performed
abortions. Prior to his murder, Dr. Gunn's name, address,
photograph and other personal information were the subject of
two different wanted-style posters. The first ''Wanted'' poster
stated in large, bold font that Dr. Gunn was an "abortionist."12
The poster instructed the reader to attempt to persuade Dr.
Gunn to leave his profession by writing personal letters as well
as praying and fasting. 13
The second poster, entitled
"Unwanted," was more straightforward and deliberate. It
stated that Dr. Gunn killed children at designated locations,

the defendants violated both state and federal RICO statutes. See Planned Parenthood
of the ColumbiaIWillamette v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 945 F.Supp. 1355
(D. Or. 1996). As previously noted, the RICO charges are outside the scope of this Note.
However, the portion of the overall damages award that was based on RICO statutes
will be discussed briefly in Part V infra notes 215 to 242.
9
See infra notes 72 to 137 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 138 to 214 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 215 to 247 and accompanying text.
12 Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/ Willamette, Inc., 290 F.3d at 1063-1064.
13 Id. at 1064.
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and that he should be considered "heavily armed and very
dangerous" to "defenseless unborn babies."14
Around the time of Dr. Gunn's murder, a similar wantedstyle poster circulated depicting the name, address and
physical description of Dr. George Patterson, an abortion
provider who operated a clinic in Mobile, Alabama. On August
21, 1993, less than six months after the murder of Dr. Gunn,
Dr. Patterson was shot and killed in front of his Mobile clinic.
Dr. John Baynard Britton replaced Dr. Gunn and
continued to provide abortions at the Pensacola clinic. On July
29, 1994, Paul Hill, an anti-choice activist shot and killed Dr.
Britton as he entered another abortion clinic in the Pensacola
area. James Barrett, Dr. Britton's volunteer escort was also
killed in the attack. Hill wounded James Barrett's wife, who
was present at the scene and witnessed her husband's murder.
As with Dr. Gunn, Dr. Britton was the subject of an
"Unwanted" poster. The poster listed his home and office
addresses and phone numbers, as well as his photograph and
physical description. 15 It further stated that Dr. Britton was
wanted for "crimes against humanity" and that he should be
considered "armed and extremely dangerous to women and
children."16
The purpose of this Note is not to enter the abortion fray
and discuss whether Michael Griffin or Paul Hill, both of whom
were ultimately convicted of the murders of doctors Gunn and
Britton, should have been allowed to present a defense of
justifiable homicide at trial.l7 Nor is the purpose to explore the
connection, if any, between the posters and the murders of
doctors Gunn, Patterson and Britton. Rather, the sole purpose
of this Note is to analyze whether the use of subsequent
posters-which depicted different doctors but contained
essentially the same type of personal information-should be
considered political speech protected by the First Amendment,
or a 'true threat.'

Id.
Planned Parenthood of the ColumbialWillamette, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1135
(D. Or. 1999).
16
Planned Parenthood of the ColumbialWillamette, Inc., 290 F.3d at 1063.
17 Burnett, Crane, Dodds, Foreman, McMillan, Ramey and Stover, all defendants in
the instant case, prepared a statement following Gunn's murder that supported
Griffin's acquittal based on a theory of justifiable homicide. See id. at 1064.
14

15
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Recently,
in
Planned
Parenthood
of
the
ColumbialWillamette Inc., v. American Coalition of Life
Advocates, (hereinafter, Planned Parenthood) the Ninth Circuit
narrowly decided en banc that the use of such posters, as well
as a website that contained similar personal information about
abortion providers and their supporters, was not protected
speech. 18 The court held that the use of these mediums to
convey personal information about abortion providers
constituted threatening speech in violation of FACE,19 FACE
imposes criminal and civil liability on anyone who by "force or
threat of force" interfere with those engaged in providing
reproductive health services. 20 In Planned Parenthood, FACE
exposed the defendants to civil penalties in the form of an
enormous monetary award as well as a permanent injunction. 21
The subject of abortion, while certainly a moral and
philosophical issue to some, is undoubtedly a highly politicized
issue to most Americans. Speech on highly charged political
issues has traditionally been given a wide berth with respect to
18 Id. at 1088-1089. As of the current date, five decisions have been published
regarding this case, three in the District of Oregon, and two handed down from the
Ninth Circuit. The first was the district court's denial of the defendants Motion to
Dismiss in Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition
of Life Activists, 945 F. Supp. 1355 (D. Or. 1996) [hereinafter Planned Parenthood 1].
The second published opinion was the court's denial of the defendants Motion for
Summary Judgment in Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc., v.
American Coalition of Life Activists, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (D. Or. 1998) [hereinafter
Planned Parenthood II). Next came the district court's issuance of a permanent
injunction against the defendants in Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette,
Inc., v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1130 (D. Or. 1999)
[hereinafter Planned Parenthood 111]. Fourth, finding that the district court erred in
allowing the jury verdict to stand because it commingled the non-violent actions of the
defendants with the violent actions of the third parties, a three-judge panel of the
Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded in Planned Parenthood of the
Columbia/Willamette, Inc., v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 244, F.3d 1007 (9th
Cir. 2001) [hereinafter, Planned Parenthood IVJ. Fifth, citing that the issues in the case
were "obviously important," the Ninth Circuit reheard the case en banco There, holding
that "ALCA's conduct amounted to a true threat and is not protected speech," a six to
five majority reversed the panel's earlier decision and reinstated the trial courts
findings as to injunctive relief and civil damages, but vacated the punitive damages
award and remanded the for consideration of whether the award comported with due
process. Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc., V. American Coalition
of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002) [hereinafter, Planned Parenthood V).
19 See 18 U.S.C. § 248(a).
20 Id.
21 See Planned Parenthood V, 290 F.3d at 1066.
In addition to the permanent
injunction the compensatory and punitive damage award of the FACE claims, when
added to the RICO damage award, totaled $120,868,893.00. See id. See also, note 5
supra.
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First Amendment protection. 22 Speech that incorporates the
use of personal information about a political adversary and
then disseminates that information via posters or the internet
in an effort to either persuade like-minded individuals to
action, or to dissuade the adversary, is at the core of our notion
of free speech. While this form of activism is of questionable
taste and is no doubt distressing to those in the opposing camp,
neither the fear it engenders nor the tastelessness of the
method takes the speech outside of the purviews of the First
Amendment. 23 In short, unless such activism amounts to a
'true threat' it is protected and guaranteed by the First
Amendment. 24 This Note argues that the majority in Planned
Parenthood failed to properly interpret and apply over four
decades of precedent that defined what constitutes a 'true
threat.' Furthermore, in allowing the injunction to stand and
endorsing the crushing monetary damage award, the court
silenced previously protected speech and improperly narrowed
the constitutional protections of the First Amendment.

B. THE CASE
In October 1995, four abortion providers Dr. Robert Crist,
Dr. James Newhall, his wife, Dr. Elizabeth Newhall and Dr.
Warren M. Hern, along with two clinics that provided abortion
Planned
Parenthood
of
the
services,
including
ColumbialWillamette, filed a lawsuit in the federal district
court for the district of Oregon seeking injunctive relief and
over 200 million dollars in damages. 25 The suit named as
defendants several individual activists, all of whom were
directors of either the American Coalition of Life Advocates
("ACLA") or the American Life Ministries ("ALM"), as well as
the organizations themselves. The ACLA was a newly-formed

22 See e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964). The First
Amendment was "fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing
about of political and social changes desired by the people." Id.
23 See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
24 True threats are proscribable under the holding of Watts. See Watts, 394 U.S. at
707. The Supreme Court has also recognized other types of speech that fall outside the
First Amendment including 'incitement,' Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448
(1969); and 'fighting words,' Chapiinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572-573
(1942).
25 See Planned Parenthood I, 945 F. Supp. at 1355.
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anti-choice group that advocated the use of violence to bring an
end to the institution of legalized abortion in the United
States. 26 The founding members of the ALCA had at one time
been members of Operation Rescue, the foremost anti-choice
organization in the United States. 27 The founders of ACLA
split from Operation Rescue when the latter publicly
condemned murders of doctors Gunn, Patterson and Britton
and the use of violence against abortion providers in general. 28
The ACLA's commitment to the use of violence to end abortion
is evidenced by the statement of one of the founders who noted
that if someone were to condemn the use of violence against
abortion "they probably wouldn't have felt comfortable working
with US."29
The plaintiffs alleged that they had been the targets of
threats by the ACLA and the ALM, as well as the individual
named defendants. The plaintiffs brought their suit under the
recently enacted FACE statute, which imposes both civil and
criminal liability on any person who uses "force or threat of
force ... [to] ... intimidate ... or attempt to intimidate ...
any person ... providing reproductive health services. "30 The
defendants argued that the "Wanted" style posters and
website 31 were neither threatening, nor intimidating and filed
a motion to dismiss followed by a motion for summary
judgment. 32 Both motions were denied and the case went to
trial in January of 1998.
After a month long trial, the jury deliberated for four days
and found for the plaintiffs. The jury ordered the defendants to
pay the plaintiffs over $525,000 in general compensatory
damages and over $108 million in punitive damages. 33 In
addition to this large monetary damage verdict, the trial court
later held that allowing the defendants to maintain the website
and continue to use both the "Wanted" and "Unwanted" style
See Planned Parenthood III, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1136.
See Planned Parenthood V, 290 F.3d at 1064.
28 Id.
29 See Planned Parenthood III, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1136.
30 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(l).
31 Allegations based on the "Nuremberg Files" web site were amended to the
complaint after the case was originally filed.
32 See Planned Parenthood I, 945 F. Supp. at 1355 (Motion to Dismiss), and
Planned Parenthood 11,23 F. Supp. 2d at 1182 (Motion for Summary Judgment).
33 See Planned Parenthood Vat 1066n.4; see also Part V infra notes 215 to 218. The
jury also awarded over 12 million dollars on.both Federal and Oregon RICO claims. Id.
26

27
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posters would place the plaintiffs in a constant fear of death
and bodily harm. 34 In response to this finding, the trial court
issued a permanent injunction that enjoined and restrained the
defendants from republishing or reproducing the posters and
from further distributing any information contained in the
"Nuremberg Files" website. 35
.
The ACLA and the individual defendants timely appealed
the decision, claiming that the First Amendment protected
their actions. 36 Mter reviewing the record de novo, the panel
stated that neither the posters nor the website mention
violence or expressly threaten anyone. Moreover, the court
found that the statements were made in the context of public
discourse on a highly politicized issue. Although the panel
noted that words alone are not dispositive in assessing whether
the statements constituted a 'true threat,' they found that only
so much could be inferred from the context of the speech.37 The
court conceded that the publishing of the plaintiffs' personal
information might make it easier for persons to carry out
violent attacks against them, but held that political speech may
not be punished if its only sin is that it may make it more likely
that "someone will be harmed at some unknown time by an
unrelated third party."38
Given that the defendants'
statements were made publicly and did not expressly threaten
the plaintiffs, the court vacated the damages verdict and
remanded with instructions to dissolve the injunction. 39
Citing that the issues in the case were "obviously
important," the Ninth Circuit granted the plaintiffs' petition to
rehear the case en bane. 40 The plaintiffs argued that the trial
court correctly allowed the jury to use the murders of doctors

See Planned Parenthood III, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1155-1156.
See id.
36 See Planned Parenthood IV; 244 F.3d at 1013.
37
See United States v. Hart, 212 F.3d 1067, 1071 (8th Cir. 2000). There, the
defendant parked a Ryder Truck in front of an abortion clinic. The court held that in
light of the use of a Ryder truck in the Oklahoma City bombing-the defendant knew or
should have known that clinicians would fear for their lives. Thus the use of the truck,
and not any words spoken by the defendant, was considered a 'true threat.' Note,
however that liability was also premised on the fact that the defendant told his father
that he intended to threaten the clinicians in order to save the lives of unborn babies.
See id. See also Part IV infra, notes 196 to 203.
38 See, Planned Parenthood IV; 244 F.3d at 1015.
39 Id. at 1019-1020.
40 See Planned Parenthood V, 290 F.3d at 1062.
34

35
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Gunn, Patterson and Britton as a contextual backdrop to find
that the posters and website constituted 'true threats' within
the meaning of FACE. The plaintiffs contended that the case
was properly delivered to the jury and that the verdict as well
as the injunction ordered by the district judge should be
reinstated. 41 In contrast, the ACLA argued that the district
court decision should be reversed because "liability was based
on speech that constituted neither an incitement to imminent
lawless action nor a 'true threat,' and as such was merely
political speech."42 The defendants further contended that
their otherwise, protected political speech could not be
mitigated into the realm of unprotected speech simply because
there was a context of violence created by the actions of third
parties. 43
In a narrow 6 to 5 decision the panel agreed with the
plaintiffs' contentions, finding first, that the district court
properly applied existing 'true threat' jurisprudence to the jury
instructions, and second, that the ALCA was aware that the
wanted-style posters and the information contained on the
website would be interpreted by reproductive services
providers as "serious threats of death or bodily harm" in
violation of FACE.44 The panel was "independently satisfied
that to this limited extent, the ACLA's conduct amounted to a
true threat and [was] not protected speech."45 The en bane
panel thus affirmed the district court findings as to the general
damages and equitable relief.46 .

C. THE THREATS
At trial, and ultimately on appeal, three specific "threats"
were at issue. The first was a wanted-style poster entitled "The
Deadly Dozen," which was either created or endorsed by each
defendant.
The poster contained the names and home
addresses of thirteen separate abortion providers. The second
See id. at 1071.
Id. at 1071·1072.
43 Id. at 1071.
44 Id. at 1067.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 1086.
Note that the panel vacated the punitive damages portion of the
jury verdict and remanded to see whether the award comported with due process. See
id.
41

42

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2003

9

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 3

10

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33

threat was a wanted-style poster (the Crist Poster) portraying
Dr. Robert Crist, one of the four physicians who initially filed
suit against the defendants.
The final threat was the
"Nuremberg Files," a website that contained personal
information about over four hundred abortion providers and
their supporters that the defendants contributed to and
operated. As the information contained in these two types of
mediums constituted the bulk of the evidence used to find the
defendants liable for threatening and intimidating the
plaintiffs, the content of each will be described thoroughly.
1. The "Deadly Dozen" Poster

In January 1995, defendant ACLA created and printed the
"Deadly Dozen" poster. At the top, the poster reads "GUILTY"
and underneath, in smaller print, "OF CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY." The poster explains that during WWII the
Nazi's allowed abortion for Jewish women and the Allies
prosecuted those Nazis as war criminals under "Allied Control
Order No. 10" during the Nuremberg trials of 1945-1946. 47
Underneath this information lays the heading "THE DEADLY
DOZEN." Under this heading the poster lists the names and
the home addresses of thirteen physicians who provide
abortions. Of the thirteen physicians on the list, three, Dr.
James Newhall, Dr. Elizabeth Newhall and Dr. Warren Hern
were plaintiffs in the instant case. The poster offers a "$5,000
REWARD" "for information leading to the arrest, conviction
and revocation of license to practice medicine. "48 At the bottom
of the poster, in large print, reads the word "ABORTIONIST."
Following the ACLA's release of the poster during a rally in
Washington, D.C., the FBI contacted each of the physicians
named on the poster and offered the services of the U.S.
Marshals to provide twenty-four hour personal security for the
physicians and their families. 49 Upon hearing that the poster
had garnered such a response by both the physicians and the
authorities, defendant ALM republished the poster in its own
Life Advocate magazine. 50
47

48
49
50

See Planned Parenthood V, 290 F.3d at 1064.
Id.
See Planned Parenthood III, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1132.
Id.
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2. The Crist Poster

In August of 1995, eight months after the release of the
"Deadly Dozen" poster, the ACLA released a similar poster
focusing on Dr. Robert Crist. The ACLA released the "Crist
Poster" during a rally on the steps of the old federal courthouse
in St. Louis, which not coincidentally, was the same federal
courthouse where the infamous Dred Scott case was decided. 51
Each of the named defendants either assisted in the creation of
the poster, or ratified its release. 52 As with the Deadly Dozen
poster, the top of the Crist Poster reads, in large print,
"GUILTY," and below, in smaller print, "OF CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY." Mter divulging Dr. Crist's personal
information, including his home and business addresses, the
poster implores the reader to "write, leaflet or picket his
neighborhood to expose his bloodguilt." In still smaller print,
the poster offers a "$500 REWARD" "to any ACLA organization
that successfully persuades Crist to turn from his child killing
through activities within ACLA guidelines. "53 Again, as with
the "Deadly Dozen" poster, the word "ABORTIONIST" appears
in large, bold font at the bottom of the poster. Immediately
following the release of the Crist Poster, the St. Louis police
contacted Dr. Crist and suggested that he take additional
security precautions in light of the poster. 54
3. The Nuremberg Files Website

In 1996, at a rally in Washington, D.C., commemorating
the valor of those incarcerated for anti-abortion violence, the
ACLA unveiled the "Nuremberg Files" website. The website's
stated purpose was collecting dossiers on abortionists in
anticipation ,of one day prosecuting them for crimes against
humanity. 55 The founders wanted to use the information to
61
See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856). See also Planned Parentlwod V,
290 F.3d at 1065 (there, the defendants were trying to draw a correlation between the
Dred Scott Court's holding that blacks were considered property under the
constitution, and that in the eyes of the defendant's, so too were unborn babies under
our current law). Id.
62 See Planned Parenthood III, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1133.
63 See Planned Parenthood V, 290 F.3d at 1065.
64
See Planned Parenthood III, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1133.
65 See Leigh Noffsinger, Comment, Wanted Posters, Bulletproof Vests, and the First
Amendment: Distinguishing True Threats from Coercive Political Advocacy, 74 WASH.
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ensure that "once the tide of this Nation's opinion turns against
the wanton slaughter of God's children" and abortion becomes a
crime, abortion providers would have a different fate than
many Nazi war criminals at Nuremberg, who were set free due
to a lack of evidence. 56 Under the heading of "ABORTIONIST,"
the website listed the names of over two hundred abortion
providers, as well as the names of another two hundred
"accomplices," most of whom were politicians, judges, police
officers and other abortion rights supporters.57 The names of
the four physician plaintiffs all appeared under the heading of
"ABORTIONISTS." Employees and directors of the two health
clinic plaintiffs also appeared in the Files. 58 In addition to the
lists of providers and supporters, the site contained a legend,
which stated that the names that appeared in black font were
"Still Working," those that were greyed-out were "Wounded,"
and those with a red strikethrough were "Fatalities." The
names of doctors Gunn, Patterson and Britton all had a
strikethrough. 59
None of the "threats" at issue contain any expressly
threatening language. The posters offer "Rewards" for any
member of the ACLA who is successful in persuading (via
lawful means such as picketing, fasting or praying) any doctor
to desist from providing abortions. The posters do not offer
rewards to anyone who kills a doctor. Nor do they contain any
express language that could be construed as suggesting that
others commit violence against the doctors, such as wanted
"dead or alive." Similarly, the website contains no explicit
threat. And while it does contain the personal information of
those listed, there is nothing to suggest that the creators
themselves intended that the information be used to help
commit violence against the doctors.
Lack of an express threat is not dispositive. The courts
have held that threats can be implied from the context in which

L. REV. 1209, 1213 (1999).
66 See Nuremberg Files website at httpll.www.christiangallery.com/atrocity.
67 See Planned Parenthood V; 290 F.3d at 1065.
68 See Planned Parenthood III, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1133.
69 See Planned Parenthood V; 290 F.3d at 1065.
See also Leigh Noffsinger,
Comment, Wanted Posters, Bulletproof Vests, and the First Amendment:
Distinguishing True Threats from Coercive Political Advocacy, 74 WASH. L. REV.
1209, 1213 (1999).
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they were delivered. 60 This is true, even in instances where no
words were spoken between the deliverer of the threat and his
intended target. 61 The lack of any express threat in Planned
Parenthood means that the court had to infer the "threats"
entirely from the context in which they were delivered. That
"context" was the murders of the other doctors by third parties
who had no relation to the defendants in the instant case. 62
Where the court or a jury must infer a threat entirely from
context, there is a distinct possibility that the sins of the
unassociated violent actors will be visited upon the non-violent
defendants on trial for
allegedly threatening behavior.63
When courts impose liability where there is no express threat
and no evidence that the defendants intended to convey a
threat, political activists who take unpopular political positions
may suffer, and the umbrella of the First Amendment becomes
less effective.

II.

THE FREEDOM OF ACCESS TO CLINICS ENTRANCES ACT
AND ITS CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS.

Congress enacted FACE in May of 1994. 64 The Act was
signed into law during the air of violence that encapsulated the
murders of doctors Gunn and Patterson and was primarily
enacted to counter the growing number of methods employed
by anti-choice activists to deny women access to clinics that
provide reproductive services. 65 The Senate noted that in the

See e.g., Watts, 394 U.S. at 708 (1969).
See Hart, 212 F.3d at 1069·1070 (8th Cir. 2000) (there, the defendant parked a
Ryder Truck in front of an abortion clinic. The court held that in light of the use of a
Ryder truck in the Oklahoma City bombing-the defendant knew or should have known
that clinicians would fear for their lives. Thus, it was the use of the truck was the 'true
threat' and not any words spoken by the defendant). Id.
62 See Planned Parenthood V, 290 F.3d at 1090 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). There was
no evidence that the defendants in the instant case ever engaged in violent acts against
abortion providers. [d.
63
See Jennifer E. Rothman, Freedom of Speech and True Threats, 25 HARV. J. L. &
PUB. POL'Y 283, 346 (2001). "Some of the most difficult cases to analyze are those
where the alleged threat is not explicit ... the courts reliance on subjective factors often
results in decisions that restrict speech that ought to be protected by the First
Amendment." [d. Furthermore, without a showing of intent, "there is a danger that
ambiguous statements, not intended as threats will be interpreted as threats under the
reasonable speakerllistener test." Id. at 316.
64 See 18 U.S.C. § 248.
66 See H.R. Rep. 103-306 (1993), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 699 (1994).
60

61
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previous fifteen years, documented instances of violence,
including bombings, arson and physical blocking of clinic
entrances numbered in the several thousands. 66 In an effort to
curb the trend of violence and intimidation tactics used against
both the women who sought abortions and the doctors who
provided them, the Act allows for the imposition of civil and
criminal liability on any person who uses "force or threat of
force" to intimidate or attempt to intimidate people from
obtaining or providing reproductive health services. 67 FACE
does not define what is meant by the term "threat," but the
creators admonished that the Act should not be construed to
"prohibit any expressive conduct protected from legal
prohibition by the First Amendment."68 Therefore, liability for
using "force or threat of force" requires that the court define
what constitutes a threat in a way that is consistent with the
First Amendment. 69
FACE provides a cause of action to any person prevented
from either obtaining or providing reproductive services by the
conduct proscribed by the statute. 70 In terms of the civil
remedies available to the aggrieved, the Act gives discretion to
the court and allows for any appropriate relief, including
temporary and permanent injunctions as well as compensatory
and punitive damages. 71

III.

WATTS, BRANDENBBURG AND CLAIBORNE HARDWARE:
ARTICULATING THE 'TRUE THREAT' STANDARD

The core issue in Planned Parenthood is the point at which
impassioned, inflaming and even caustic political speech
crosses the line and loses the protections of the First
Amendment. In some areas, the courts have drawn a bright
line between protected and unprotected speech. Thus, we know
that speech that tends to incite immediate lawless action is
unprotected,72 as is speech that, when taken in context, is
66 See Id. (documenting specific instances of violence and intimidation including
bombings, instances of arson and acid attacks).
67
18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(I).
68 Id. § 248(d)(I).
69
See Planned Parenthood V, 290 F.3d at 1071.
70
18 U.S.C. § 248(c)(1)(A).
71
18 U.S.C. § 248(c)(1)(B).
72
See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448.
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likely to provoke immediate violence, usually characterized as
"fighting words."73 Similarly, speech that, again, when taken
in context constitutes a 'true threat' also falls outside the
protections of the First Amendment. 74 But at what point does
speech become truly threatening to the listener? In the area of
'true threat' jurisprudence, the line drawn by the Court is
much less distinct. One reason for the haziness is that both
Supreme Court decisions, as well as those of lower courts, often
commingle, though not necessarily wrongly, the prohibition of
speech and conduct using both incitement and 'true threat'
theories. 75
While the issue has been narrowed in the years since the
Supreme Court first announced a standard in Watts v. United
States, several important questions still remain unanswered.
The most important of which is at what point does the context
in which the threat was made take on more importance than
the speaker's intent to actually threaten the listener? This
question becomes especially important if, as in Planned
Parenthood, there was no explicit threat and there was no
evidence that the defendants intended to threaten or physically
harm the plaintiffs.
Much of the 'true threat' precedent came out the somewhat
tumultuous eras that included both the civil rights and antiwar movements. Watts v. United States involved an explicit
threat to kill then President Lyndon Johnson. 76 In August
1966, Watts attended a public rally at the Washington
Monument to protest the war in Vietnam. 77 Mter the rally,
attendees divided into smaller discussion groups.78 Watts was
part of a group discussing the subject of police brutality. At one
point, Watts-who was 18 at the time and had just received his
draft notice-was overheard by an Army Counter Intelligence
Agent as stating, "I'm not going [to Vietnam]. If they ever
make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is
L.B.J."79 Watts was convicted under a 1917 statute that
See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572-573.
See Watts, 394 U.S. at 706. 'What is a threat must be distinguished from what is
constitutionally protected speech." [d.
75 See e.g., Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 898 (1982).
76
Watts, 394 U.S. at 705-706.
77 [d. at 705.
78 [d. at 706.
73

74

79

[d.
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prohibited any person from knowingly and willfully making a
threat to take the life of the President of the United States. 80
lllustrating the importance of intent in 'true threat'
jurisprudence, both of the lower courts grappled with the
meaning of the statute's "knowingly and willfully" requirement.
In upholding Watts' conviction, The United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia found that the
requirement is met if the words were spoken "with an apparent
determination to carry them out."81
In reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court noted that
regardless of the statute's intent requirement, the government
was first required to prove that the speech constituted a true
threat. 82 The Court found that the type of political hyperbole
Watts engaged in, taken in context, did not fit within this
statutory scheme. 83 In announcing its decision, the Court
stated that Congress's selection of the word 'threat' in the
statute must be set against the backdrop of a "profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open, and may
well include vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly
sharp attacks on government and public officials."84
Although the decision in Watts falls well short of
establishing a bright line distinction between protected speech
and a 'true threat,' the opinion is nonetheless noteworthy in
three important respects. First, the Court announced that
taken in context, Watts' speech was not threatening because it
was clear that he had neither the immediate ability nor the
inclination to carry out the threat. 85 Second, the opinion
suggests that although some speech may be expressly
threatening, such speech remains protected by the First
Amendment unless, taken in context, that speech would
constitute an immediate threat to the intended target.86 Third,
connecting Watts' "threat" to kill LBJ with our long tradition of
protecting and even encouraging "robust and wide-open"

so
8l
82
83

84
85

86

Id.
See id. at 707.
Id. at 708.
Id.
Id. (citing New York Times Co., 396 U.S. at 270).
Watts, 394 U.S at 707.
Id. at 708.
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political debate, the opinion indicates that even expressly
threatening speech can fall within the purview of the First
Amendment if the speech is made in a political, as opposed to
private, context. S7
Less than six months after its decision in Watts, the
Supreme Court further distinguished unprotected speech from
protected political advocacy in Brandenburg v. Ohio.sS In
Brandenburg, the petitioner was the self-professed leader of a
Ku Klux Klan group based in Hamilton County, Ohio. s9 The
petitioner invited a reporter from a Cincinnati news station to
attend and film one of the Klan's upcoming organizational
meetings. 90 The reporter accepted and he and a cameraman
attended the meeting. The film showed twelve men dressed in
full Klan garb. 91
While portions of the film were
incomprehensible, several of the attendees can be heard
making derogatory remarks about Mrican Americans and
Jews. 92 At one point, the petitioner addressed the gathering
and stated, "We're not a revengant (sic) organization, but if our
President, our Congress and our Supreme Court continues to
suppress the white, Caucasian race, its possible that there
might have to some revengence (sic) taken."93
Petitioner was arrested and convicted of violating Ohio's
now defunct Criminal Syndicalism Act. 94 The Act prohibited
any person from voluntarily assembling and advocating the
duty, necessity or propriety of violence or unlawful methods of
terrorism as a means of accomplishing political reform. 95 In
striking down the Ohio Act as a violation of both the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that
the statute failed to distinguish between mere advocacy from
"incitement to imminent lawless action."96 The Court noted,
"the mere abstract teaching ... of the moral propriety or even
Id. (citing New York Times Co., 396 U.S. at 270).
See e.g., Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 444·448.
89 Id. at 445.
90 Id.
91
Id. at 445, 446.
92 Phrases that were audible included; "[B)ury the niggers, we intend to do our
part" and "[N)igger will have to fight for every inch he gets from now on." [d. at 444·
446 (1969).
93 [d.
94 Id. at 445.
95 Id. at 444.
96 Id. at 448.
87

88
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moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not the
same as preparing a group for violent action."97 Under
Brandenburg, speech that condones and even advocates the use
of violence in the abstract is constitutionally protected by the
First Amendment, so long as the speech, taken in context, is
not likely to lead to imminent lawless action. 98
Thus, while not expressly referring to Watts, Brandenburg
expands the standard articulated there. Watts stands for the
principle that expressly threatening speech must be taken in
context, and the context must include the speaker's ability to
immediately harm the intended target. 99
The standard
articulated in Brandenburg, that speech remains protected
even if it advocates the use of violence, so long as such
advocacy will not result in "imminent lawless action" is
consistent with Watts. Even though Brandenburg was decided
using an incitement theory, what emerges from the two
decisions is a narrower definition of what constitutes a 'true
threat.' First, threats made publicly involving political or
social issues deserve heightened scrutiny by the courts.lOO
Second, a threat must be taken in context, and the context
must include the speaker's desire and ability to immediately
harm the intended target.1 01 And finally, speech that expressly
or impliedly advocates the use of violence to effect social or
political change remains protected by the First Amendment,
unless that speech, taken in context, is likely to incite
immediate lawless action. 102
The Supreme Court's unanimous decision in NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware further reinforces the standards gleaned
from both Watts and Brandenburg. lo3 Claiborne Hardware
arose out of a seven year boycott of white merchants by the
local chapter of the NAACP in Claiborne County,
Mississippi. lo4 The economic boycott sought to force the
merchants to comply with a list of demands issued by the
NAACP seeking justice and racial equality for the Mrican
97
98
99

100
101
102
103
104

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Watts, 394 U.S. at 705 (1969).
See id.
Id. See also Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 446·448 (1969).
Id.
See e.g., Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
Id. at 889·890.
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Americans who patronized the downtown stores.1° 5 The white
merchants filed suit in Mississippi state court alleging that the
boycott amounted to malicious interference with their business
interests.1 06 The trial court agreed, awarding the merchants
over one million dollars in damages based on the merchants
loss of earnings and goodwill over the seven year boycott.107 In
addition to awarding civil damages, the court issued a broad
based injunction that banned the use of 'store watchers.'108 The
injunction and sizable damages award effectively broke the
boycott. 109
The use of threatening speech was a major factor in the
lower court's decision to award damages and grant the
injunction. llo In bringing their suit, the merchants alleged that
several Mrican American patrons in Claiborne County were
threatened into participating in the boycott. ll1 As evidence of
this contention the merchants pointed to several speeches
made by Mr. Charles Evers, the Field Secretary of the NAACP
in Mississippi. Mr. Evers was instrumental in organizing the
boycott and made several speeches throughout its duration to
the members of the First Baptist Church.1 12 During the April
1, 1966 meeting at which the decision to boycott was reached,
Evers warned the crowd that the Mrican Americans in the
town would be watched, and anyone caught trading with the
white merchants "would be answerable to him."113 Similarly,
the merchants pointed to another speech given by Evers on
April 19, 1969, in which he stated that all boycott-violators
would be "disciplined" by their own people.1 14 Two days later,
Evers admonished the crowd at First Baptist stating that "if we
catch any of you going in any of them racist stores, we're gonna
break your damn necks."115
The lower court noted that African Americans who violated

105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115

Id. at 889.
Id. at 889, 890.
Id. at 893.
Id.
[d.
[d at 894.
[d.
[d. at 898-903.
[d. at 900.
[d. at 902.
Id.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2003

19

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 3

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33

20

the boycott were "disciplined" in a variety of ways. First, the
boycott organizers placed "store-watchers" known as "Deacons"
or "Black Hats" in front of the merchants' stores.116 The
"Deacons" noted the names of those in the African American
community who were actively violating the boycott. The
violators' names were read aloud at weekly NAACP meetings,
as well as reproduced in the local Black Times newspaper.ll7
In addition to the seemingly innocuous threat of
embarrassment in the community, boycott violators also faced
the very real threat of physical violence. The trial court
admitted evidence that indicated that the homes of two boycott
violators were shot at, a brick was thrown through the
windshield of one of the violator's cars, and a woman's flower
garden was trampled by a youth who had witnessed her
trading with white merchants.1 18 Another man testified that
four men beat him when he failed to observe the boycott.1l9
The Mississippi Supreme Court upheld Evers' and the
NAACP's liability based on the lower court's common law tort
theory. 120 The court held Evers jointly and severally liable for
the civil damages and found that his speeches amounted to
unprotected threats, and that these threats led to acts of
violence in an effort to effectuate the boycott. 121 In dismissing
Evers' argument that his speech was protected by the First
Amendment, the court stated that the "evidence shows the
volition of many black persons was overcome out of sheer
fear."122 Furthermore, the court opined that many boycotters
were forced to participate in the boycott based on Evers'
threats, and the use of violence and intimidation by supporters
of the boycott. 123
A discussion of what constitutes unprotected speech was
central to the U.S. Supreme Court's reversal of the lower
court's decision. Although the Court again stopped short of
articulating a 'true threat' test, the unanimous OpInIOn
nonetheless adds to the standards set forth in Watts and
116
117
118

119

120
121
122
123

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 903·904.
at 904.
at 905.
at 894.
at 895.
at 894.
at 894·895.
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Brandenburg. The Court noted that although Evers' speeches
certainly contained threats, and those threats were acted upon,
his speeches were still within the protections of the First
Amendment. 124
In commenting on the 'threat' of social
ostracism and the use of social pressure as a means to enforce
the boycott, the Court noted that, "speech does not lose its
protected character simply because it may embarrass others or
coerce them into action."125 Finally, the Court acknowledged
that while Evers' statements may have been considered
coercive and intimidating to non-participants, his speeches and
conduct were still protected by the First Amendment. 126
The real marvel of the opinion is that the Court protected
speech that expressly threatened an identifiable group of
people that had every reason, both objectively and subjectively,
to fear the truth of those threats based on a history of
intimidation and violence practiced by the boycotters. In
finding that Evers' speeches and threats were protected by the
First Amendment, the Court noted that the emotionally
charged speeches were made publicly for the purpose of uniting
the African American community to realize their political and
economic powers.1 27 The Court noted that even if Evers'
express threats to "discipline" and to "break the damn necks" of
boycott-breakers were construed as inviting unlawful activity,
his speech was nonetheless protected under Brandenburg,
because advocating the use of violence is a protected form of
speech unless, taken in context, it tends to incite "imminent
lawless action."128 Although there was evidence that acts of
violence against non-participators followed one of Evers'
speeches, his conduct did not transcend the protection of the
First Amendment because the violence did not immediately
follow the speech. 129
Finally, in vacating the damages award, the Court
commented on the difficulty of imposing monetary liability for
conduct made up of constitutionally protected activity.1 30 The

129

Id. at 907.
Id. at 910.
Id. at 911.
Id. at 928.
Id. (citing Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448).
Claiborne Hardware, 485 U.S. at 928.

1M

Id. at 918.

124
125
126
127
128
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Court noted that in these circumstances, a "precision of
regulation is demanded" that requires courts and juries to
determine with specificity exactly what damages, if any, were
proximately caused by the defendants' unprotected conduct, as
only these damages are recoverable. 131 The Court recognized
that while a variety of remedial measures are available to the
states to deal with violence and threats of violence, "damages
[must be] restricted to those directly and proximately caused by
the wrongful conduct chargeable to the defendants."132 The
court stated that it is of "prime importance that no
constitutional freedom, least of all the guarantees of the Bill of
Rights, be defeated by insubstantial findings of fact screening
reality."133 Since the conduct of Evers and the NAACP was
constitutionally protected, the Court found that none of the
business losses incurred by the businessmen were proximately
caused by the boycott. 134 Therefore, because the lower court's
determination of liability was premised on unsubstantiated
findings of causation it "screen [ed] reality," and could not
stand. 135
Admittedly, no hard and fast test exists for defining just
when one's speech or conduct will be deemed a 'true threat.'
But, by combining the conclusions of Watts, Brandenburg and
Claiborne Hardware a workable standard begins to emerge.
Watts limits a 'true threat' to arising only in situations where
the words were immediately threatening to the intended target
of the threat. Moreover, Watts suggests that both the content
of the threat, as well as the context in which it was made, must
be taken into account in assessing the immediacy requirement
of what constitutes a 'true threat.' Brandenburg stands for the
principle that the mere advocacy of violence does not take
speech outside the First Amendment, unless the advocacy,
taken in context, tends to incite immediate lawless action.
Id.
Id. at 918 (citing United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966) (noting that
although, "[T]he careful limitations on damages liability imposed in Gibbs resulted
from the need to accommodate state law with federal labor policy, [TJhat limitation is
no less applicable, however, to the important First Amendment interests at issue in this
case. '). Id. (emphasis added».
133 See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 924 (citing Milk Wagon Drivers v.
Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 293 (1941».
134
See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 924.
135 Id.
131

132
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Similar reasoning is found in Claiborne Hardware. First,
following Watts, the public context in which the speeches were
made was important in finding that Evers' coercive speech and
tactics were protected. Second, following Brandenburg, speech
that advocated the use of violence was protected, even though
violence ensued, because the violence didn't occur immediately
after the speech, nor was it directly attributable to it. Third,
recognizing our "profound national commitment" to "robust and
wide-open debate" Watts, Brandenburg and Claiborne
Hardware all emphasized the heightened First Amendment
protections garnered by speech made in the political arena. 136
Finally, where monetary damages are based on speech or
conduct that could be properly considered constitutionally
protected activity, Claiborne Hardware dictates that courts
must approach the problem with a "precision of regulation" to
ensure that no constitutionally protected freedoms are
impinged upon by insufficient findings.137

IV.

APPLICATION OF THE 'TRUE THREAT STANDARD TO THE

FACTS OF PLANNED PARENTHOOD

While the Constitution clearly protects most speech, it
surely does not protect all speech.
Individuals have a
constitutional right to be safeguarded against both speech and
actions that pose an immediate threat to life or limb. 138 But at
what point does a listener's fear that the speaker, or someone
acting in concert, will harm him override the speaker's actual
intent to harm? The question is more pointed if, as is the case
here, the court does not even have an explicit threat from
which to glean the speaker's intent. FACE seeks to punish the
speaker's intent to convey a threat to use force to intimidate
the listener.1 39 Should we require a showing of an actual intent
to convey a threat, or is the context in which the message was
delivered enough to infer that a threat was delivered? Should
the standard be whether a reasonable listener would feel
threatened by the remark, or whether it should have been
136
137

136

See id. at 913.
See id. at 916.
See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 927·928; see also Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at

448.
139

See 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(l).
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reasonably foreseeable to the speaker that the remark would
inspire fear in the listener? The Ninth Circuit was presented
with these difficult questions in Planned Parenthood.
Though the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of FACE
requires a showing that the actor intended to threaten, the
majority in Planned Parenthood seems to indicate that the
context in which the defendant's implied threats were delivered
is almost entirely dispositive.1 40 Without requiring that the
defendants convey an explicit threat, or at a minimum, require
a showing of intent to threaten, the majority allowed liability to
be premised on the plaintiffs' fear, which was based, given the
plaintiffs' testimony, on the context of violence that surrounded
the un-related actions of third parties.1 41 But before silencing
political discourse, the First Amendment requires more than a
showing that the plaintiffs were subjectively afraid of the
defendant's tactics-it reqUIres that they were 'truly
threatened' by them.142
The majority in Planned Parenthood is guilty of two
colossal oversights. First, the majority failed to apply the
standards announced in Watts, Brandenburg and Claiborne
Hardware to the facts of Planned Parenthood, citing that those
decisions "provided benchmarks, but no[t] definitions," as to
what constitutes a 'true threat.'143 Most glaring in this respect
is the court's refusal to acknowledge and apply the factual
similarities between Claiborne Hardware and the instant case.
In abandoning this precedent, the court relies on its own
"reasonable speaker test" to define what is meant by a 'true
threat.' The second oversight occurred when the court then
curiously failed to apply the reasonable speaker test to the
facts of the instant case. Instead, the court deceives the reader
by relying on cases that employed the reasonable speaker test,
yet bear little or no resemblance to the facts of Planned
Parenthood. As will become clear, the likely reason for both
140
See Planned Parenthood V; 290 F.3d. at 1078. The majority argued that "[iJndeed
context is critical in true threats cases and history can give meaning to the medium" in
which the treat was delivered. Id. (emphasis added).
141
See Planned Parenthood V; 290 F.3d at 1091 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
"Plaintiffs themselves explained that the fear they felt came, not from the defendants,
but from being singled out for attention by abortion protesters across the country." Id.
142
See Watts, 394 U.S. at 707. "What is a threat must be distinguished from what is
constitutionally protected speech." Id.
143
See Planned Parenthood V; 290 F.3d at 1071.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol33/iss1/3

24

Nicholson: The Future of Free Speech

2003]

THE FUTURE OF FREE SPEECH

25

these omissions is that the ACLA's actions could not be
considered a 'true threat' even by the standard announced by
the majority, nor could the majority uphold the decision while
remaining faithful to the holdings of Watts, Brandenburg and
Claiborne Hardware.

A. DISMISSING

WATTS, BRANDENBURG AND CLAIBORNE

HARDWARE: FAILING To APPLY THE STANDARDS To THE
FACTS OF PLANNED PARENTHOOD

ACLA contends that liability was improperly based on
political speech that constituted neither a 'true threat' nor
incitement to imminent lawless action.l 44 Since both the
posters and the website contain no explicit threat, the ACLA
argued that the case is really an incitement case in disguise. 145
Given the lack of an express threat, the ACLA argues that the
case should be analyzed against the holding of Claiborne
Hardware, and that in light of that case, the decision should be
reversed. As noted above, Claiborne Hardware stands for the
principles that (1) the First Amendment protects intimidation
and threats of social ostracism as well as offensive and coercive
speech; (2) speech made publicly on highly charged political
issues lies at the core of the First Amendment and courts must
assess the imposition of liability with extreme care; and (3) civil
liability for offensive and coercive speech cannot be imposed
solely on account of a person's association with individuals who
commit violence unless the individual incited or authorized the
violence himself.146
The similarities between Claiborne and Planned
Parenthood are clear. First, both cases involved the efforts of
groups engaged in the pursuit of a common political goal.
Second, both groups used intimidating and coercive tactics to
advance their political agendas; here the defendants attempted
to coerce the plaintiffs into ceasing to provide abortions, and in
Claiborne Hardware the effort was to force others to comply
with the boycott. 147
Third, in both cases the defendants
144
145
146

See Planned Parenthood V, 290 F.3d at 1070·1071.
See id. 1072.
See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 910, 926·928 (citing Brandenburg, 395 U.S.

at 448).
147

See Planned Parenthood V, 290 F.3d at 1095 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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gathered publicly available information about their political
adversaries and disseminated that information in an effort to
coerce and intimidate the latter into action. Finally, similar to
Claiborne Hardware, the defendants here face liability because
their efforts to coerce others in furtherance of their political
agenda were placed against the backdrop of the violent attacks
made by unassociated third parties.
The only apparent difference between the two cases is the
outcome. In Claiborne Hardware, direct threats made as part
of a political and social effort that were followed by violent acts
of associated third parties were considered simply "emotionally
charged rhetoric" that did not "transcend" the First
Amendment. 148 Here, public speech made on an issue of social,
moral and political importance that merely intimidated the
listener and was not followed by violence, was enough to
support a crushing monetary judgment and an injunction that
silenced, what the defendants believed was nothing more than
political activism.
The majority, however, rejects the idea that Claiborne
Hardware is analogous, and points to several apparent
dissimilarities between the cases. The majority's effort to
distinguish Claiborne Hardware from the instant case does not
withstand scrutiny and only serves to highlight the majority's
unfamiliarity with the facts of either Claiborne Hardware,
Planned Parenthood, or both. First, the majority attempts to
distinguish Planned Parenthood by pointing to the fact that
Claiborne Hardware was not decided under a threat statute,
thus the Court did not need to consider whether Evers'
statements were 'true threats.'149 This is only partially true.
While Claiborne Hardware did not arise under a threat statute,
respondents argued that liability was proper because Evers
"threatened violence" to coerce participation in the boycott.150
In addressing this allegation, the Court undertook to establish
whether Evers' speeches were outside the First Amendment,
either as 'true threats,' or incitement to imminent lawless
activity. 151 Whether the case arose under a threats statute is
not important when answering whether the First Amendment
148
149
150
151

See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 928.
See Planned Parenthood V; 290 F.3d at 1073.
See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 897.
See id. at 927.
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protects the speech. Clearly, as the majority in Planned
Parenthood recognized, a 'true threat' for the purposes of FACE
requires a "definition which comports with the First
Amendment."152 It makes little impact on the present case that
it was decided under FACE, since it is the First Amendment
that defines the effectiveness of FACE. Similarly, it made little
difference to the outcome of Claiborne Hardware that the case
did not arise under a threat statute. In each, the question
essentially is not whether the speech or conduct violated the
statute, but whether it fell outside the protections of the First
Amendment.
Since the Court addressed whether Evers'
speeches were threatening, the majority here errs in alluding
to a dissimilarity because the present case was decided under a
statute.
Second, the majority attempts to distinguish Claiborne
Hardware from the instant case by arguing that in Claiborne
there was no context in which to place Evers' speeches, while
the murders of doctors Gunn, Patterson and Britton provided
context in which to analyze the threatening nature of the
ACLA's speech Planned Parenthood. 153 This again is unfaithful
to the facts of both Claiborne Hardware and Planned
Parenthood. First, Evers' threats to "break the damn necks" of
non-participators are directly threatening, thus context was not
necessary in that instance to determine whether the speech
was threatening, as the threat is apparent on the face of the
statement. Second, in Claiborne Hardware there was ample
context in which to assess whether Evers' speech was
threatening. It was well noted in the trial record that nonparticipators were subject to instances of physical violence and
social ostracism. 154 Thus, lack of context does not distinguish
Claiborne Hardware from the instant case.
The majority further attempts to distinguish Claiborne
Hardware from Planned Parenthood by arguing that in the
former, Evers did not threaten specific individuals, while here,
the ACLA clearly singled out the Plaintiffs. While it is true
that the ACLA specifically identified and targeted the
Plaintiffs, this fact does not distinguish the case from

152
153
154

See Planned Parenthood V, 290 F.3d at 1071.
See id. at 1073.
Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 902-906.
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Claiborne Hardware. It is clear from the facts of Claiborne
Hardware that the names of specific individuals who broke the
boycott were announced at weekly NAACP meetings as well as
reprinted in the town's weekly Black Times newspaper.155
Surely those who broke the boycott and were singled out at the
meetings and in print felt threatened or intimidated, not by
Evers or the NAACP, but by the fact that those participating in
the boycott knew who they were. This is no different from the
facts of Planned Parenthood. Here, the plaintiffs testified that
their fear came not from being directly threatened by the
defendants, but from being singled out for attention from rightto-life groupS.156 Furthermore, given the small population of
Claiborne County, Mississippi, and the zealous efforts of the
"Deacons" to enforce the boycott by stationing themselves
outside the storefronts, it is reasonable to infer that individuals
who broke the boycott felt threatened by Evers' speeches. The
fact that both cases involved apparent threats directed to
specific targets highlights the factual similarities between the
cases, not their dissimilarity.
The majority also emphasizes that Claiborne Hardware
provided no evidence that either Evers or the NAACP
participated in, or authorized any violence against those who
did not participate in the boycott.157 While it is certainly true
that neither Evers nor the NAACP participated in violence,
this fact does not distinguish Claiborne Hardware from
Planned Parenthood. Here, like Claiborne Hardware, there is
no evidence that the ACLA, or any of the named defendants
ever authorized or participated in violent acts against the
plaintiffs. Moreover, the record in Planned Parenthood notes
only one instance where an individual participated in the
making of a "wanted" poster and later resorted to violence, but
that individual was not a defendant in the instant case. 158
See id. at 903·904.
See Planned Parenthood V; 290 F.3d at 1091. Dr. Newhall, one of the plaintiffs
testified at trial that her fear "came from being identified as a target ... [and that] ...
all the John Silva's [anti-abortionists] in the world know who I am, and that's my
concern." Id. Similarly, Dr. Hern, also a plaintiff, testified that he was terrified when
he found out he was on the list stating that, "its hard to describe that ... you are on a
list of people who have been brought to public attention this way." Id.
157 See Planned Parenthood V; 290 F.3d at 1073-1074.
158 See id. at 1091 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
Paul Hill, a right-to-life activist,
participated in the making of Dr. Britton's 'Wanted' poster and then shot him some
seven months after the poster was released. Id.
155

156
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Again, the majority fails to distinguish Claiborne Hardware
from the facts of Planned Parenthood.
Finally, the majority attempts to distinguish Claiborne
Hardware by arguing that unlike Planned Parenthood, where
the plaintiffs took seriously the perceived threats made by the
defendants, no one took Evers' threats seriously, thus the
Court was able to find that they were not 'true threats.'159 To
support this contention, the majority opines that Mrican
Americans must not have felt threatened since they continued
to shop at the boycotted stores. 160 This logic cannot withstand
scrutiny, and upon closer examination actually hurts the
majority's cause.
First, under the Ninth Circuit's own
definition, a 'true threat' is based, not on the listener's fear, but
on the speaker's belief that his words or actions will convey his
intent to cause physical harm. 161 Thus, for the purposes of
characterizing Evers' speech as a threat, it does not matter
whether the threat was heeded, but only whether Evers knew
his words would be interpreted by the listener as threatening.
Surely Evers intended such a result. Second, since the
majority asserts that threats are not 'true threats' unless they
are heeded by the listener, then a fortiori the threats in the
instant case must not be considered 'true threats' since the
plaintiffs here continued to perform abortions after they became
aware of the posters. 162 As the conduct of the threatened party
is not dispositive as to whether a statement is a 'true threat,' it
follows that Claiborne Hardware is indistinguishable from
Planned Parenthood in this regard.
As the dissent properly notes, the few dissimilarities that
do exist between the two cases only highlight that the Planned
Parenthood is far weaker factually to support liability for
threatening speech.163 First, Claiborne Hardware involved
explicit threats to specific targets that were followed by
violence. 164 Here, the defendants made statements that lacked
See Planned Parenthood V, 290 F.3d at 1074.
[d. (emphasis added).
161
See id. (citing United States v. Orozco· Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir.
1990».
162
See Planned Parenthood V, 290 F.3d at 1066. Dr. Crist did stop practicing
medicine for some time after the release of the poster out of "fear for his life," but he
did in fact return. [d.
163 See id. at 1095 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
164
See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 928.
159

160
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an express threat, and the statements were not followed by any
acts of violence. 165 Second, Claiborne Hardware involved
statements that were threatening on their face. 166 In Planned
Parenthood, given the lack of an express threat, the jury heard
two weeks of testimony regarding recent violence against
abortion providers-violence which was not committed by the
defendants-in order to give the threats their proper context. 167
In Claiborne Hardware, direct threats made on issues of a
political nature, followed by violent acts of unassociated third
parties were considered "political hyperbole" and protected by
the First Amendment. Here, socially and politically expressive
public speech that contained no express threat and was not
followed by violence was enough to support a permanent
injunction and a remarkable damages verdict. Though a far
weaker case factually, the majority here chose to impute
liability, while the Supreme Court refused to do so in Claiborne
Hardware.
In addition to rejecting Claiborne as factually analogous,
the majority also turns away from one of its central holdingstaken from Watts and Brandenburg-that speech made
publicly on political or social issues requires heightened
scrutiny before it can be stripped of its First Amendment
Protections.1 68 Here, the alleged threats were communicated
publicly. Both the posters and the website were unveiled at
political rallies seeking to garner support for the defendant's
political points of view. 169 Undoubtedly, the posters and the
See Planned Parenthood V. 290 F.3d at 1072.
See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 902. During an April 21, 1969 speech Evers
told listeners that if any Mrican American broke the boycott he would ''break your
damn neck." Id. Similarly, in another speech Evers informed listeners that they would
be "answerable to him" if they shopped at stores owned by the white merchants. Id at
900.
167
See Planned Parenthood V. 290 F.3d at 1078.
168 See Watts, 394 U.S. at 708
(given our "profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open, and
may well include vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on
government and public officials') Id. (citing New York Times Co. 376 U.S. at 270. See
also Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 926·927 (where liability is based on "a public
address-which predominantly contained highly charged political rhetoric lying at the
core of the First Amendment-we approach the suggested basis for liability with
extreme care"). Id.
169 See Planned Parenthood V. 290 F.3d at 1064·1065. The Deadly Dozen Poster as
well as the Nuremburg Files website were unveiled at a Washington, D.C., rally
protesting Roe u. Wade. Similarly, the Crist Poster was unveiled on the footsteps of the
St. Louis Courthouse that handed down the Dred Scott decision in an effort to draw a
165

166
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website were devices used to convey the defendants'
sociopolitical message. The majority however, declines to
frame the defendants' statements as amenable to heightened
protections stating that, threatening speech is proscribable
"however communicated."170 Instead of analyzing whether the
defendants' statements were entitled to heightened
protection-as mandated by Watts and Brandenburg-the
majority simply finds first that the statements were 'true
threats,' then correctly states that threats are not entitled to
First Amendment protection.l 71 Here, the majority puts the
cart before the horse. What they should have done is first
address whether the statements could properly be considered
threats in light of the political backdrop in which they were
made, given the heightened protection such speech deserves,
and then address whether within this context, the speech was
threatening.l 72 To decline to place the defendants' statements
within this contextual framework is contrary to the holding of
Watts, Brandenburg and Claiborne Hardware.
Though factually and legally relevant, the majority chooses
to ignore the importance of Claiborne Hardware. The reason is
obvious. Were the court to acknowledge Claiborne Hardware it
would have no choice but to reverse given the similarities
between the two cases. Recognizing the importance of robust
public debate, Watts, Brandenburg and Claiborne Hardware
told us that speech publicly directed at issues of social and
political importance should be analyzed with extreme care
before liability is imposed and speech silenced. Planned
Parenthood involves socially and politically important speech
and thus should have invoked this heightened standard. Yet,
the majority rejects this assertion.l 73 Similarly, Claiborne
Hardware holds that the First Amendment protects
intimidating speech that aspires to coerce others to take a
particular action. Planned Parenthood involved the efforts of a
correlation between blacks being considered property, and unborn babies, according to
the defendants, also being considered property under current law. [d.
170 See Planned Parenthood V; 290 F.3d at 1076 (citing Madson v. Women's Health
Ctr. Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994».
171 Planned Parenthood V; 290 F.3d at 1076 ..
172 See id. at 1088-1089 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
173 See id. at 1076. "Neither do we agree that threatening speech made in public is
entitled to heightened constitutional protection just because it is communicated
publicly rather than privately." [d.
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political minority to coerce their political adversaries into
taking certain actions in furtherance of their political agenda.
Yet the majority claims that the two cases are not analogous.1 74
Finally, relying on Brandenburg, Claiborne Hardware holds
that liability for intimidating and coercive speech cannot be
imposed on the basis of a persons association with individuals
who commit violence, unless the individual himself authorized
or incited the violence.1 75 The instant case involves statements
that are not expressly threatening, yet could become so when
viewed against the backdrop of violent acts committed by third
parties who are unassociated with the defendants. Liability
here was undoubtably premised on the actions of those third
parties.
The majority reasoned that Claiborne Hardware was not
analogous and thus, not applicable. Instead, they articulated a
"reasonable speaker test" and then failed to apply it. The
reason they failed to apply it mirrors the reason they elected to
dismiss Claiborne Hardware: namely that the application of its
own test would, like an acknowledgment of Claiborne
Hardware, require that the court reverse.

B.

OBFUSCATION: THE REASONABLE SPEAKER TEST AND THE
MAJORITY'S FAILURE To APPLY IT.

In place of the 'benchmarks' provided by the Supreme
Court, the Ninth Circuit employed a "reasonable speaker test"
to decide if the posters and the website were 'true threats' and
thus outside the protections of the First Amendment. 176 The
test holds that whether a statement may be considered a 'true
threat' is governed by whether a "reasonable person would
foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to
whom the maker communicates the statement as a serious
expression of intent to harm or assault."177 The panel defined a
threat as, "an expression of an intention to inflict evil, injury or
damage upon another," and stated that alleged threats must be
174

175

See id. at 1072.
See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 926-928 (citing Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at

448).

See Planned Parenthood V; 290 F.3d at 1074.
See id. (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d
1262, 1625 (9th Cir. 1990».
176

177
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weighed "in light of their entire factual context, including the
surrounding events."178 Under this test, a 'true threat' exists
where a reasonable person would foresee that the listener
would believe he was about to be subjected to physical
violence. 179
Mter articulating the standard from which the liability of
the defendants will be judged, the court fails to apply it.
Rather than assess whether the defendants conduct constituted
a 'true threat,' the court uses a sleight of hand, citing other
cases where a 'true threat' was found under the reasonable
speaker test, but whose facts bear no resemblance to those of
Planned Parenthood. Instead of analyzing whether liability
was proper under the reasonable speaker test, the court tells us
that context in which the alleged threat was communicated is
critical. l80 Instead of pointing to evidence that the defendants'
'threats' communicated a serious expression of intent to
physically harm or intimidate the plaintiffs-as required by the
reasonable speaker test and FACE-the court opines that the
posters and websites were symbols that had acquired a
"currency of death" in the wake of the previous murders.181
These symbols, according to the majority, effectively put the
defendants on notice that their conduct was likely to convey a
threat. 182 By pointing to context, symbols and currencies, the
majority is attempting to divert the reader's attention from
their utter failure to provide evidence that the defendants
expressed an intention to threaten the plaintiffs. In drawing
the reader's attention away from this crucial fact, the court is
able to find the defendants liable without any showing that
their conduct failed the majority's own test.
The majority cites several cases to support their contention
that liability was proper in the instant case. Although the cases
found that the defendant's speech or conduct amounted to a
"true threat," none are factually or legally relevant to Planned
Parenthood. In United States v. Dinwiddie, liability was
See id. at 1075.
See id.
180 See id. at 1078. The majority noted that "indeed context is critical in a true
threats case." Id.
181 See id. at 1079.
182 See id. at 1085. "The posters are a true threat because like Ryder trucks and
burning crosses, they connote something that they do not literally say, yet both the
actor and the recipient get the message." Id.
178
179
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premised on the defendant making express threats directly to
the intended target. 183 There, the defendant made several
remarks outside an abortion clinic warning the plaintiff /doctor
to, "remember Dr. Gunn ... This could happen to you ... Whoever
sheds a man's blood, by man his blood shall be shed."184 She
further stated, "[Y]ou have not yet seen violence until you see
what we do to yoU."185 The Eight Circuit interpreted FACE's
'force or threat of force' to proscribe Mrs. Dinwiddie's conduct
and upheld an injunction ordering her to stop violating
FACE.l86
Similarly, the majority relies on United States u. Kelner.
In Kelner, the defendant was convicted of transmitting an
interstate threat in violation of a federal statute.l 87 Kelner
involved threats made against Yasser Arafat prior to a 1974
visit to the United Nations in New York.l 88
During a television interview, the defendant-dressed in
military fatigues and holding a handgun-stated that, "[WJe
have people who have been trained and ... who intend to make
sure that Arafat and his lieutenants do not leave this country
alive."189 When pointedly asked by the reporter if he intended
to kill Arafat, the defendant replied "We are planning to
assassinate Mr. Arafat."190 Kelner argued that his statements
were "political hyperbole" protected by the First Amendment. 191
The Second Circuit disagreed. In affirming the defendant's
conviction the court looked to the explicitness, immediacy,
specificity and context of the statements. 192 Given that the
threats were explicit ("we are planning to assassinate");
immediate ("we have people who have been trained and are out
now"); specific ("Arafat and his lieutenants") and the context
(military clothing and the handgun), the court reasoned that

United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913 (8th Cir. 1996).
Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 917.
185 Id. (emphasis added).
186 Id. at 929.
187 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) criminalizes transmitting "in interstate commerce any
communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the
person of another." Id.
188 See United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1021 (2d Cir. 1976).
189 See Kelner, 534 F.2d at 1021 (emphasis added).
190 Id. (emphasis added).
191 Id. at 1022.
192 Id. at 1028.
183

184
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Kelner's statements were true threats and not protected by the
First Amendment. 193
Dinwiddie and Kelner are so factually dissimilar to
Planned Parenthood that their appearance as support for the
majority's position is suspect. First, both Dinwiddie and
Kelner involved express threats; the former, a direct threat to
the intended target, while the latter communicated his threat
to a specific target via the television. Moreover, in invoking the
first person plural ("we are planning to assassinate" and ''You
haven't seen violence until you see what we do to you") both
parties expressed, not only intent to threaten, but also intent
that they or someone acting in concert would harm or assault
the victims.l 94 As the dissent in Planned Parenthood properly
notes, when a statement expressly threatens violence, the
speaker expresses intent to harm the target, and then admits
that he or she is among those that will help bring about that
harm, it is hardly surprising that courts impose liability.195
The above cases could be considered analogous to Planned
Parenthood only if the defendants there had either: (1) directly
confronted the plaintiffs and expressly threaten that they
intended to harm the plaintiffs-as was the case in
Dinwiddie---or, (2) created posters or a website in which the
defendants expressly stated that it is their intent to
assassinate or murder the plaintiffs, similar to Kelner. Of
course, this was not the case. Here, the only evidence offered
to illustrate the defendants' requisite intent to threaten were
implied "statements," which were then placed against the
backdrop of the violent acts of third parties.
The majority also relies on United States u. Hart to
illustrate that liability was proper in the instant case. At first
blush, Hart appears somewhat analogous to Planned
Parenthood. Closer scrutiny, however, reveals that while Hart
also involved an implied threat, the defendant there displayed
the requisite intent to threaten or intimidate that is lacking in
the instant case. On September 25, 1997, Hart, an anti-choice
activist, parked two Ryder trucks outside the entrances of two
[d.
See id. at 1021. "We are planning to assassinate Mr. Arafat." [d. See also
Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 917. "Patty, your have not seen violence yet until you see what
we do to you." [d.
195 See Planned Parenthood V; 290 F. 3d at 1098 (Kozinski, J., dissenting);
193
194
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Little Rock, Arkansas abortion clinics. 196 He was indicted and
later found to have violated the same 'force or threat of force'
clause of FACE used to find the defendants liable in Planned
Parenthood. 197 The Eighth Circuit disagreed with Hart's
argument the trucks, standing alone, could not constitute a
'true threat.'198
In addition to context and the likely
connotations made about Ryder trucks in the wake of the
Okalahoma City bombing, the court relied on evidence that
Hart was a regular demonstrator at the two clinics and that he
could provide no legitimate reason for parking the trucks other
than to threaten the plaintiffs. 199 Most importantly, testimony
offered at trial by Hart's father indicated that Hart intended to
threaten the plaintiffs. Hart evidently told his father that it
would be worth it "if people believed there was a bomb in one or
more of the trucks" if it helped to save the life of one baby.20o
No doubt, the Hart court's finding that threats can be
inferred from the medium provided the Planned Parenthood
majority with basis for finding the defendants here liable for
trafficking in threatening symbols and "currencies."201 Hart,
however, is distinguishable in at least two important respects.
First, as the dissent properly notes, the threat in Hart "did not
come from the message itself, but from the potentially
dangerous medium used to deliver it." Thus, the "symbols" (the
trucks) themselves were threatening because it was possible
that they were filled with explosives. Clearly, the perceived
threat in the instant case did not come from the paper on which
the posters were printed, but from the possibility that someone
might harm the plaintiffs based on the information contained
in the posters. 202 Hart would be analogous only if the
defendant there printed posters of Ryder trucks, or put images
of Ryder trucks on an anti-choice website. Second, Hart was
found liable because he intended to threaten the plaintiffs.
Hart deliberately chose the Ryder truck because of the truck's
See United States v. Hart, 212 F.3d 1067, 1069 (8th Cir. 2000).
See Hart, 212 F.3d at 1070.
198 ld. at 1072.
199 ld. at 1072.
200 ld. at 1070.
201
See Planned Parenthood V; 290 F.3d at 1085. "The posters are a true threat
because like Ryder trucks and burning crosses, they connote something that they do
not literally say, yet both the actor and the recipient get the message." ld.
202 See supra note 156.
196
197

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol33/iss1/3

36

Nicholson: The Future of Free Speech

2003]

THE FUTURE OF FREE SPEECH

37

connection to violence after Oklahoma City; telling his father
that it would help saves babies lives if the clinicians believed
there were explosives on the truck. 203 Although the case
involved an implied threat, the Hart court was correct in
upholding liability because the medium used to express the
threat was itself potentially dangerous, and the defendant
expressly stated that it was his intent to threaten the
plaintiffs. Neither of these elements was present in Planned
Parenthood.
The defendants in the cases relied upon by the majority
displayed the intent to threaten required by both FACE and
the reasonable speaker test. 204 Yet the majority displays no
evidence that the defendants in the instant case intended to
threaten the plaintiffs. Without evidence of intent, the
defendants' conduct could not be construed as a 'true threat'
even under the standard announced by the majority. In the
absence of intent, the defendants' 'threats' must be viewed, at
best, as an incitement or call for others to harm the
plaintiffs. 205 And while it undoubtedly makes little difference
to the plaintiffs whether the harm will come from the
defendants themselves or some unassociated third-party, it
does make a difference with respects to the First
Amendment. 206 The Supreme Court has expressly stated that
liability cannot be squared on the basis of violent acts
committed by third parties unless the defendant incited those
violent acts himself. 207
It is precisely because they lack evidence of intent that the
majority opinion traffics in "currenc[ies]" and symbols in order
to find the defendants liable. 20B As their only credible basis for
liability, the majority states that doctors Gunn, Britton and
Patterson were murdered after their posters were released and
See Hart, 212 F.3d at 1070.
See Planned Parenthood V; 290 F.3d at 1076. The intent to threaten (i.e., the
intent that the statement will be understood as a threat) is subsumed within the
statutory standard of FACE which requires that the threat be made with the intent to
intimidate. "The requirement of intent to intimidate serves to insulate the statute from
unconstitutional application to protected speech." Id. (citing United States v. Gilbert,
813 F.2d 1523, 1529 (9th Cir. 1989) and construing the Fair Housing Act's "threat"
provision, which, is essentially the same as the one that appears in FACE).
205 See Planned Parenthood V; 290 F.3d at 1092 (Kozinski, J., dissenting.)
206 See Id.
207 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447·448.
208 See Planned Parenthood V; 290 F.3d at 1079, 1085.
203
204
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therefore the poster format had "acquired currency" as a death
threat.209
"Knowing this," the majority continued "and
knowing the fear [the posters] generated among those in the
reproductive health services community ... the defendants
deliberately identified [the plaintiffs] to intimidate them."210
But a plaintiffs fear cannot form the sole basis for liability.
Both FACE and the majority's own test require that the
speaker intended to send the message that they intended to
engage in physical violence. 211 Moreover, as the Supreme
Court made clear in Claiborne Hardware, tactics that merely
intimidate or coerce the listener cannot form the basis for
liability unless the speaker incites imminent lawless action. 212
For speech to be considered a true threat there must be
evidence that the speaker himself intended to convey the
message that he, or his accomplices, would immediately harm
the target. 213 Since the majority offers no evidence of the
necessary intent, it follows that the defendants' conduct must
not be considered a 'true threat.'
The failure of the majority to find the necessary intent may
not be its fault. Some commentators have suggested that the
reasonable speaker test is almost unworkable in instances
where the threat is implied, precisely because it is difficult to
find the requisite intent. 214 Whatever the shortcomings of the
standard applied by the majority, it is clear that liability in the
instant case was improper. There is no evidence to suggest
that the defendants here intended to threaten that they, or
someone acting in concert, would harm the plaintiffs.
Furthermore, liability was improper as a matter of law because
there is no evidence that the defendants conduct failed the
reasonable speaker test. Moreover, reversal is required based
See [d. at 1079.
See [d.
211
See [d. at 1091 (Kozinski, J., dissenting.)
212 See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 910, 928 (citing Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at
447,448).
213
See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447-448.
214 See Jennifer E. Rothman, Freedom of Speech and True Threats, 25 HARV. J. L. &
PUB. POL'Y 283, 346 (2001). "Some of the most difficult cases to analyze are those
where the alleged threat is not explicit...the courts reliance on subjective factors often
results in decisions that restrict speech that ought to be protected by the First
Amendment." [d. Furthermore, without a showing of intent, "there is a danger that
ambiguous statements not intended as threats will be interpreted as threats under the
reasonable speakerllistener test." [d. at 316.
209
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on the holdings of Claiborne Hardware and factual similarity
between it and the instant case. As stated above, if the
Supreme Court was unwilling to impute liability for
intimidating and coercive speech where the speaker himself
explicitly threatened violence and violent acts followed the
speeches, it is absolutely non sequitor for the Ninth Circuit to
premise liability on speech that was not expressly threatening
and was not followed by violence.
V.

THE REMEDY

The imposition of liability in Planned Parenthood was
improper. So too was the remedy. The defendants here faced
an unprecedented damages award for threatening speech. On
the FACE claims, the jury awarded $405,834 to Planned
Parenthood of the ColumbialWillamette ("PPCW"), $50,243 to
Portland Feminist Women's Health Center ("PFWHC"),
$39,656 to Dr. Crist, $15,797 to Dr. Elizabeth Newhall, $14,429
to Dr. Hern, and $375 to Dr. James Newhall as to general
compensatory damages. 215 The Jury also awarded punitive
damages on the FACE claims in the amounts of $29.5 million
to PPCW, $23.5 million to PFWHC, $14.5 million to Dr. Crist,
$14 million to Dr. Elizabeth Newhall, $13 million to Dr. Hern,
and $14 million to Dr. James Newhall. 216 On the civil RICO
claims the jury awarded the plaintiffs (after trebling) over $12
million dollars.217 All told, the jury found that the defendants
in the instant case 'threatened' the plaintiffs to the tune of over
$120 million dollars.218
None of the cases cited by the majority Planned
Parenthood that involved a FACE claim (cases premised on
expressly threatening conduct by the defendants) awarded
monetary judgments anywhere near the size of the one

See Planned Parenthood V, 290 F.3d at 1066.
Id. at 1086. Although the majority vacated the punitive damages portion of the
award and remanded to determine if it comported with due process, the award must be
upheld unless it is considered "grossly disproportionate" Id. See In re Exxon Valdez,
270 F.3d 1215, 1241 (9th Cir. 2001).
217 Id. Although the RICO claims are outside the scope of this note, the damages
awarded under them will be discussed here briefly.
218 Actually, when the compensatory and punitive damage award of the FACE
claims are added with the RICO damage awards the totaLis $120,868,893.00. Id. at
1066.
215

216
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awarded here. In fact, only one, Hart, even upheld the
imposition of a monetary damage award, and that was merely
a nominal "special assessment" fine in the amount of fifty
dollars.219 The jury in Hart found the defendant guilty of
violating FACE by using the Ryder trucks to threaten the
clinicians, and the court sentenced the defendant to probation
and community service in addition to the fine. 220 Similarly, the
remedy in Dinwiddie was not a large compensatory and
punitive damage award, but rather a narrowly tailored
injunction. 221 Dinwiddie too is instructive for the amount of
care the court took in defining the parameters of the injunction.
The court carefully outlined conduct that it would view as a
violation FACE in the future, but also balanced Ms.
Dinwiddie's interest in free expression. 222 Thus the court held
that while Ms. Dinwiddie could no longer engage in conduct
that violated FACE in the future, she was still free to engage in
forms of protest that didn't violate FACE, such as distributing
literature, picketing and speaking outside of the clinic. 223 The
defendants in both Hart and Dinwiddie expressly threatened
their intended targets, invoked fear in those targets and
caused significant disruption in their daily lives, yet neither
decision led to the financial ruin of the defendants, nor did it
significantly chill free speech.
Similarly, Claiborne Hardware is indicia of the Supreme
Court's hesitancy to impose monetary damages for speech or
conduct that is, or may be, constitutionally protected. There,
the Mississippi Supreme Court ruled that boycotters were
coerced and threatened into participating in the boycott by
Evers'speeches. 224 The threats and coercion used to effectuate
219 Note that both Hart and Dinwiddie were prosecutions by the U.S. government.
While FACE directly limits the amount damages the government can recover in these
actions (between $10,000 and $15,000 for first violation, and $15,000 to $25,000 for
subsequent violations, the fact that the recovery is limited is irrelevant, what is
relevant is the fact the defendants were not required to pay damages for the political
speech that stepped from under the umbrella of the First Amendment. See 18 U.S.C. §
(c)(2)(b)(i-ii).
220 See Hart, 212 F.3d at 1070. Hart was sentenced to 4 years of probation, the first
12 to be served in home detention, 200 hours of community service and the $50.00 fine.
[d.
221
See Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 929.
222
See Planned Parenthood V. 290 F.3d at 1098.
223 See Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 929.
224
See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 890-891.
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the boycott, held the court, amounted to malicious interference
with the plaintiffs business. 225
The court subsequently
awarded the businessmen over one million dollars in damages
and lost profits. 226
The Supreme Court unanimously
227
reversed.
Finding first, that Evers' conduct was inside the
umbrella of the First Amendment and second, that courts must
proceed with caution when monetary liability is imposed for
speech or conduct that may be constitutionally protected. 228 In.
reversing the damages award, the Court stated that when
addressing whether speech or conduct is compensable "in the
context of constitutionally protected activity ... [a] precision of
regulation is demanded."229 This mandate, held the Court,
requires that only damages proximately caused by the
unlawful conduct may be recovered. 230 Moreover, the Court in
Claiborne Hardware noted that "while States have broad power
to regulated activity, [they do not] have the right to prohibit
peaceful political activity."231 The Court recognized that
damages liability was a means by which the state could
circuitously prohibit otherwise peaceful political activity, citing
Mine Workers v. Gibbs, a case where the permissible scope of
state remedies was "strictly confined" to the consequences of
the unprotected conduct. 232
Although the limitation on
damages in Gibbs resulted from a need to balance federal labor
policy with state tort remedies, the Court nevertheless held
that the careful damage limitations were no less applicable to
the First Amendment issues in Claiborne Hardware. 233 Thus
the Court recognized the chilling effect that large damages
awards can have on otherwise protected activity and took steps
to guard against it. However, neither the "precision of
regulation" directive, nor the requirement that courts carefully
limit damages liability when First Amendment principles form
the core of the case were followed in the Planned Parenthood.
At a minimum, they should have been.
225
226
227

228
229
230

231
232
233

See id.
See id. at 893.
See id. at 887.
See id. at 916.
See id. at 916 (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963».
See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 918.
See id. at 913.
See id. at 916-918.
See id. at 918.
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Similarly, the fact that over twelve million dollars of the
overall damages award was based on civil RICO should make
little difference. Since Claiborne Hardware mandates that only
those damages proximately caused by the unprotected conduct
may be recovered when First Amendment principles form the
core of the case, plaintiffs should not be allowed to recover
circuitously, (via civil RICO statutes) that which they could not
recover for directly.
Although the Supreme Court has
previously declined to apply the dictates of Claiborne
Hardware to cases imposing RICO liability for the actions of
anti-choice groups, the size of the RICO award here
distinguishes Planned Parenthood from the earlier cases. 234
The evisceration of the First Amendment, as well as the
chilling effect of a substantial damages award is foreboding to
the would-be political activist in any form. Likely exposure to
damages awards and the mere threat of lawsuits will chill
speech regardless of the theory of liability chosen by the
plaintiff.
Limiting recovery to only those damages proximately
caused when political activists step outside the umbrella of the
First Amendment is sound policy. The Supreme Court long
ago recognized that the threat of financial ruin can have a
seriously chilling effect on all manner of free speech.235 It
follows that injunctions are the proper remedy in cases where
political activism crossed the line into unprotected speech.
Injunctions have a de minimus effect on political dissidents, as
those enjoined from participating in unlawful activity are still
. free to participate in lawful forms of activism. Moreover,
injunctions are superior to monetary damages because at least
they carefully define that which is prohibited. 236 A damages
234 In Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 886 F.2d 1342 (3d. Cir. 1989)
anti·abortion protesters blocked access to the clinic, as well as trespassed in the clinic
in at least four documented instances. The 3,d Circuit held that the protester's nineyear effort to disrupt the clinic's activities deprived the center of the use of a legal
property interest, violating the Hobbs ActJRICO. However, the total award-including
damages (after trebling), cost of repairing broken property, as well as attorneys fess
and costs amounted to only $64,946.11. See Brian J. Murray: Note: Protestors,
Extortion, and Coercion: Preventing RICO from Chilling First Amendment Freedoms,
75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 691, 724-28. In contrast, the RICO award here was over 12
million dollars. See Planned Parenthood V, 290 F.3d at 1066.
236
See Planned Parenthood V, 290 F.3d at 1100 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citing
New York Times Co., 383 U.S. at 277-279).
236
See Planned Parenthood V, 290 F.3d at 1100.
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award, on the other hand, leaves future speakers at the mercy
of local juries, who decide after the fact that the speech or
conduct stepped outside the umbrella of the First
Amendment. 237
The cases relied upon by the majority in Planned
Parenthood recognized injunctions and less restrictive
alternatives as the proper tools to balance a plaintiffs'
legitimate interest in safety with the defendants' constitutional
right to protest. In this sense, Dinwiddie is instructive not
only for the amount of care the court took in defining
parameters of the injunction, but because the court declined to
attach a monetary award to the judgment. 238 Similarly, in
Hart, the defendant was not enjoined from any conduct, but
merely faced probation, community service and a nominal
fine. 239 Because of the limited nature of the sentences imposed
by the courts, both Dinwiddie and Hart were still free to
engage in protest; they just were not allowed to do so in
violation of FACE. And while the defendants here are still free
to engage in political protest, it better be of an inexpensive
varietal, as they face enormous debt that is not dischargeable
in bankruptcy and have little chance of ever regaining financial
independence. 24o Further, and perhaps more importantly, the
sheer size of the judgment will undoubtedly cause other
protesters to take notice and circumscribe their conduct
accordingly. To some, the verdict's restriction on the conduct of
anti-choice groups seems appropriate and perhaps long
overdue. But those who agree with the outcome must recognize
that while today it is anti-choice groups that bear the enormous
costs of failing to act within the First Amendment, tomorrow it
may be a less repugnant group. The First Amendment
"attempt[s] to secure the widest possible dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources," when its
Id.
See Dindwiddie, 76 F.3d at 928·929. See also supra note 219.
239
See Hart, 212 F.3d at 1070. Hart was sentenced to four years probation, the flrst
twelve months to be served in home detention, 200 hours of community service and a
special assessment of $50.00. Id.
240
See In re Treshman, 258 B.R. 613, 622 (D. Maryland 2001). Donald Treshman
was the regional director of the ACLA and a defendant in Planned Parenthood. He
237

238

flIed for bankruptcy on November 2, 1999, shortly after the initial verdict. The court
held that all judgments entered against him arising out of the case were
nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). Id.
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protections are limited, when there is silence on the issues of
our time-even though that silence may well be a welcomed
reprieve--we alllose. 241
Mter Planned Parenthood, faced with the likelihood of
substantial monetary judgments, speakers engaged in all forms
of political activism will surely hesitate, "lest they find
themselves at the mercy of a local jury."242 No doubt the lesson
of what the local jury did to the defendants in Planned
Parenthood will not be lost on those who engage in political
protest. Injunctions, or damage awards limited to only those
damages "proximately caused" by the unprotected conduct are
the proper remedies in cases that involve political speech that
falls outside the protections of the First Amendment.
Injunctions have a de minimus effect on speech. So too does
the proximate cause limitation advanced in Claiborne
Hardware, as a defendant is only liable for that which he
should have, at the least, expected to be liable for. The
defendants here could not have expected what a local jury did
to them, and the "robust and wide open debates" guaranteed by
the first amendment will surely suffer for it.
CONCLUSION

Speech "may indeed best serve its high and noble purpose
when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction
with conditions as they are, or even stir people to anger.
Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at
prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling
effects as it presses for the acceptance of an idea." 243

In her inspired dissent, Judge Berzon noted that Planned
Parenthood is proof positive that "hard cases make bad law,
and ... when a case is very hard ... there is a distinct danger
of making very bad law."244 The learned judge is right on both
accounts-Planned Parenthood was a very difficult case, and
New York Times Co., 383 U.S. at 271.
See Planned Parenthood V, 290 F.3d at 1100 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citing
New York Times Co., 383 U.S. at 277-279).
243
Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
244 Planned Parenthood V, 290 F.3d at 1101 (Berzon, J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original).
241

242
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the outcome resulted in very bad law. The case was difficult
because, like the majority, at least on some level, we want to
Indeed even the staunchest
find the defendants liable.
defenders of the First Amendment failed to show up on the
defendants behalf, with only the state chapter, but neither the
national nor local chapter, of the ACLU filing an amicus curie
brief on the defendants' behalf. 245 The absence of "friends" is
hardly surprising. The defendants' tactics were nothing short
of offensive, and certainly tasteless when viewed in the context
of murders of doctors Gunn, Patterson and Britton. But being
offensive is not a crime, neither is political activism, unless it
incites imminent lawless action or 'truly' threatens the listener.
Poor taste, coupled with the violent acts of unassociated third
parties, however much it may bother us, is not enough to
impose liability for threatening speech.
This is precisely why Planned Parenthood resulted in very
bad law. The jury here heard day-after-day of testimony
regarding the violent deaths of the doctors and the violent acts
of others.246 Yet the defendants here committed no acts of
violence. Similarly, after combing the record and analyzing the
violent and threatening acts of others, the majority here speaks
not of intent and true threats, but of "symbols" and
"currencies."247
In doing so, the majority dismissed the
standards articulated in Watts and Brandenburg and failed to
acknowledge the clear similarities between Claiborne
Hardware and the instant case. Planned Parenthood is bad
law because it stands for the principle that implied threats
with no showing of intent to harm can serve as the basis for
liability. It is bad law because in allowing the jury verdict to
stand, the court sent a powerful message to political activists in
the unfortunate position of advocating messages that are
acceptable to the majority. The message is simple: speak
quietly, and on subjects that we all agree on, or it will cost you.
Mter Planned Parenthood, that message is certainly expensive
enough to make those political activists who advocate
245 Id. at 1061. See also Steven G Gey, Article: The Nuremberg Files and the First
Amendment Value of Threats, 78 TEX. L. REV. 541, 542-544 (2000). Mr. Gey correctly
chides civil libertarians for not coming to the defense of the defendants First
Amendment claims during the first trial. See id.
246 See Planned Parenthood V, 290 F.3d at 1078.
247 See Planned Parenthood V, 290 F.3d at 1085.
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unpopular positions take notice. Simply stated, Planned
Parenthood is bad law because it eviscerates the protections of
the First Amendment and in a very powerful way chills free
speech.
Mter Planned Parenthood and its crushing damages
award, freedom of speech is not only figuratively less "free," but
also literally. Unpopular speech now carries a potentially
ruinous financial burden. In dismissing Claiborne Hardware
and finding the defendants' conduct outside the umbrella of the
First Amendment, the majority put a heavy price tag upon
what was once considered protected political discourse. The
question now becomes--can we afford to pay?
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